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In order for a hopeful applicant to be granted a patent over 
his invention, his application must satisfy several procedural and 
substantive requirements. Among the substantive hurdles that an 
applicant must clear is the mandate that patents only be issued 
to applications claiming statutory subject matter within the 
meaning of § 101 of the Patent Act. However, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has not 
construed that Section consistently over the years. Since that 
court’s formation in 1982, it has espoused two tests for statutory 
subject matter, and each time has substantially abrogated, if not 
overruled, the prior formulation. Most recently, the Federal 
Circuit has handed down the “machine-or-transformation” test 
in an attempt to redraft the limits of patent eligibility based on 
subject matter. This iBrief will explore the significant changes 
that this new test has brought to the patentability doctrine.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution expressly 
vests Congress with the power “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their . . . Discoveries.”2 That clause, however, is not an unqualified 
grant of power; and there are certain limitations on Congress’s ability to 
grant such exclusive rights. 3  Congress began exercising its authority 
under the Intellectual Property Clause in 1790 by passing the original 
Patent Act.4 The Act has undergone several revisions, the most recent of 
which was in 1952. 5
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2010. Thanks to Professor 
Ken Sibley for his comments and guidance. Any mistakes or omissions are mine 
alone. 
 In an attempt not to exceed its constitutionally 
granted authority and to give effect to various policy concerns, Congress 
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
4 Id. at 6. 
5 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–376 (2006). 
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has incorporated several restrictions on which inventions may be 
protected. 6  Among those restrictions is a threshold limitation on the 
categories of subject matter eligible for patent protection. 7
¶2 Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”
 That 
restriction, set forth in Section 101 of the Act, is the focus of this iBrief. 
8 While 
that language places certain limitations on statutory subject matter, 
Congress clearly intended those limitations to be minimal.9
¶3 Under Section 101, an invention will be deemed statutory subject 
matter if it meets the requirements for any one of four categories—
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.
  
10 The 
Supreme Court has recognized several other categories of subject matter, 
however, that are not patent-eligible. Those categories have been referred 
to collectively as “fundamental principles,” 11  and include: “laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”12 No matter how recent 
or useful the discovery of any such principle, that discovery cannot be 
patented.13 Giving somewhat more practical meaning to those categorical 
exclusions, the Court has also stated that “mental processes” are not 
eligible for patent protection.14 Furthermore, in a recent interpretation of 
the Supreme Court’s opinions, the Federal Circuit stated that “the patent 
statute does not allow patents on particular systems that depend for their 
operation on human intelligence alone.”15
¶4 Several lower court opinions have alluded to additional 
categorical exclusions from statutory subject matter, specifically, the 
“mathematical algorithm exception” and “business method exception.”
 
16
                                                     
6 See, e.g., § 102 (requiring that the invention be novel); § 103 (protecting only 
non-obvious subject matter). 
 
7 See § 101. 
8 Id. 
9 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that “Congress 
intended statutory subject matter to include anything under the sun that is made 
by man”). 
10 See § 101. 
11 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
12 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
13 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
14 Id. 
15 In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
16 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust, Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the “mathematical algorithm” and 
“business method” exceptions). 
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Those two “exceptions” deserve separate treatment, but one point that 
the Federal Circuit made very clear in In re Bilski was the rejection of 
any categorical exclusions beyond those already recognized by the 
Supreme Court.17 The “mathematical algorithm exception,” however, is 
not really a categorical exclusion. Rather, it is shorthand for the 
proposition that mathematical relationships, in the abstract, are 
fundamental principles, and thus, not patentable subject matter 18  By 
contrast, the “business method exception” was purported to be a true 
categorical exclusion from statutory subject matter and has been 
expressly rejected by the Federal Circuit.19
¶5 In theory, statutory subject matter includes “anything under the 
sun that is made by man,”
  
20  and the only categorical exclusions to 
statutory subject matter are the three species of fundamental principles.21 
Therefore, the tests of statutory subject matter that the Federal Circuit 
has handed down over the years,22 presumably, have been mere attempts 
to articulate a coherent rule with which to differentiate applications that 
claim only fundamental principles from those whose claims are drawn to 
anything else, so long as it is man-made. In Bilski, the Federal Circuit 
fashioned its latest articulation for parsing statutory subject matter, and 
that test—the “machine-or-transformation” test23
                                                     
17 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
—may be indicative of 
a significant shift in the statutory-subject-matter doctrine. Any shift that 
has occurred as a result of the new test, although affecting all process 
claims, will be especially pronounced in the area of “knowledge 
18 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981) (explaining that, while 
an application of a mathematical formula may be eligible for patent protection, 
the same formula in isolation would not be); State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 
(connecting the “mathematical algorithm” exception to the Court’s analysis of 
mathematical formulae in Diehr). 
19 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960. 
20 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
21 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Of course, “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas,” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185, are not really made by 
man; they are discovered.  
22 First, there was the “Freeman-Walter-Abele” test, which was designed to 
“identify unpatentable [disembodied] mathematical algorithms.” State Street, 
149 F.3d at 1374. Then came the “useful, concrete and tangible result” inquiry, 
which had a similar purpose to the former test. Id. at 1373. The “machine-or-
transformation” test, set forth in Bilski, has replaced both of those earlier tests. 
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60. 
23 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959. 
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products.”24
¶6 As Judge Newman pointed out, since the Federal Circuit issued 
its opinion in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc., there have been a huge number of patent applications under 
Class 705, which is the class containing business method patents.
 Software, business methods, and diagnostic tests are three 
prime examples of knowledge products. 
25 Also, 
that decision marked the beginning of a sharp increase in number of 
Class-705 applications filed per year. 26  And even though the rate of 
allowance dropped off over the past six years,27 State Street also marked 
the beginning of a dramatic increase in the total number of patents issued 
under that class per year.28
¶7 In Bilski, the application purported to claim a process
 Thus, to the extent that those patents were 
issued on the basis of the now-abrogated authority of State Street, Bilski 
has introduced a great amount of uncertainty to the validity of many 
business method patents. Because of the practical similarities between 
business methods, and software and diagnostic tests, Bilski has also 
injected a substantial amount of uncertainty into those areas. 
29 —
specifically, a business method—for hedging risk in commodities 
transactions by having a middleman buy a commodity from a producer at 
a fixed price and then selling the commodity to a consumer at a fixed 
price.30 Hence, the arrangement functions to insulate all of the parties 
from the risk of adverse market fluctuations.31
                                                     
24 In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400, at *41 (Fed. Cir. 
Jan. 13, 2009) (en banc) (per curiam) (Newman, J., dissenting). While Judge 
Newman may have limited her definition of “knowledge products” to business 
methods, her analysis is easily extended to the areas of software and diagnostic 
tests. 
 Significantly, however, 
the claims were not limited to commodities, and could involve options 
25 Id. at *42. Class 705 is titled “Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice, 
Management, or Cost/Price Determination.” U.S. PTO classification information 
is available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification.  
26 See Wynn W. Coggins, Group Director, USPTO, Update on Business 
Methods for the Business Methods Partnership Meeting 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/partnership.pps. 
27 See id. 
28 U.S. PTO statistical information available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/index.html. 
29 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that “it is 
undisputed that Applicants’ claims are not directed to a machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter). Thus, the only remaining possibility was that the 
claims were intended to be drawn to a process. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
30 Id. at 949–50. 
31 Id. 
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too.32 Similarly, the claims were not limited to implementation by any 
particular machine or apparatus.33
¶8 Under Bilski’s “machine-or-transformation” test, “an applicant 
may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his 
claim is tied to a particular machine,”
  
34 or by showing that “it transforms 
an article into a different state or thing.”35 Referencing Gottschalk v. 
Benson,36 the Federal Circuit expressed that “meaningful limits” must 
attach to the claims regardless of which route—machine or 
transformation—an applicant pursues.37 Furthermore, “the involvement 
of the machine or transformation in the claimed process” must be more 
than “insignificant extra-solution activity.” 38  Such “extra-solution 
activity” is mere clever draftsmanship by which an applicant might 
attempt to render an unpatentable fundamental principle patentable by 
“recit[ing] a specific machine or a particular transformation of a specific 
article.”39 Because the claims in Bilski were not drawn to any machine, 
the Federal Circuit did not elaborate further on the machine prong of the 
test.40
¶9 In re Ferguson involved claims ostensibly drawn to processes; 
 In later cases, however, the Federal Circuit has given guidance on 
the definition of “machine” within the meaning of its new test. 
41 
thus, Bilski was directly on point. In short, the application claimed a 
network of relationships among businesses, in which one of the 
businesses—a marketing team—would market the products of multiple, 
independent manufacturers in return for a share of the profits from each 
manufacturer and an exclusive marketing agreement as to those 
products. 42  Applying the machine-or-transformation test, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the process claims were “not tied to any particular 
machine or apparatus.”43
                                                     
32 Id. at 950. 
 The court further explained that “a machine is a 
‘concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination 
of devices . . . [that] includes every mechanical device or combination of 
33 Id. at 962. 
34 Id. at 961. 
35 Id. at 962. 
36 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (concluding that, because the mathematical 
algorithm involved in the case had “no substantial practical application except in 
connection with a digital computer,” the patent, if upheld, would effectively 
preempt the algorithm itself, despite a claim tying the algorithm to a computer).  
37 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. 
38 Id. at 962 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)). 
39 See id. at 957. 
40 Id. at 961–62  
41 No. 2007-1232, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4526, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2009). 
42 Id. at *2–3. 
43 Id. at *8. 
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mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a 
certain effect or result.’”44 Specifically, the court stated that a “marketing 
force” was not a machine within the meaning of the test.45
¶10 Thankfully, Bilski itself provided significant insight into the 
contours of the transformation analysis. The Federal Circuit tells us that, 
in order for a process to meet the requirements of § 101 by way of the 
transformation prong, the transformation “must be central to the purpose 
of the claimed process.”
 
46 While only time can tell what this statement 
really means, it appears to be a reiteration of the warning against evasive 
drafting techniques.47 With refreshing bluntness, the Bilski opinion states 
that physical or chemical transformations of physical objects are always 
going to pass muster under § 101.48 As the court recognizes, however, 
many modern functions that we generally think of as processes do not 
involve manipulation of physical objects. 49  Although a great deal of 
uncertainty remains in the precise application of the rule, Bilski is 
expressly not intended to “expand the boundaries of what constitutes 
patent-eligible transformations.”50
¶11 It seems that, in order for a process to satisfy § 101 via the 
transformation prong (outside the context of physical or chemical 
manipulation of a physical object), the process must be sufficiently tied 
to a physical entity in some way. Transformation of electronic data to a 
visual depiction will work, but presumably only if the raw electronic data 
is representative of some actual physical entity.
  
51 The mere addition of a 
data-gathering step to an otherwise unpatentable fundamental principle, 
however, will not make the claims patentable. 52
                                                     
44 Id. at *9 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 In any case, the 
45 Id.  
46 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
47 See id. at 957 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)). 
48 See id. at 962; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69–70 (listing examples of 
chemical and physical processes that would pass muster). 
49 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (offering electronics and business methods as 
examples). 
50 Id. (emphasis added). 
51 See id. at 963 (“Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public 
or private legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such 
abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or 
substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or substances.”). 
If electron data is representative of a physical entity and is transformed, there is 
no need for the process to transform the physical entity itself. Id. 
52 Id. 
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organization of relationships among individuals or legal entities will not 
satisfy the transformation prong of the test.53
¶12 While the purpose of the machine-or-transformation test is 





current doctrine leaves many important questions unanswered. The 
discussion that follows is an analysis of Bilski’s effects on three types of 
“knowledge products,” based on subsequent applications of the new test 
as well as an educated guess as to some areas that have not been fleshed 
out by the courts. 
A. Before Bilski 
¶13 In addition to sparking an increase in business method patents, 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.55 was 
the catalyst for a large increase in software patents.56 For over ten years, 
the Federal Circuit’s permissive language from State Street had 
encouraged applications for both classes of patents. Although the 
independent claim in that case was drawn to a machine57 as opposed to a 
process, the principles and test expressed in the case were applicable to 
both machines and processes.58
¶14 In State Street, the patent claimed a machine for managing 
mutual funds.
  
59  Specifically, the machine could pool mutual fund 
resources into a partnership, and thus impart both tax benefits and the 
advantage of “economies of scale.”60 The parties had been negotiating a 
license for use of the patented machine, but the litigation ensued after 
negotiations broke down.61 The party that had been negotiating for the 
license then sought a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid as 
non-statutory subject matter.62




55 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
56 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for 
Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 267–68 (2000) 
(stating that State Street made business methods patentable, and discussing the 
bustle of activity in the area). 
57 See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371. 
58  See id. at 1372. 
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¶15 According to the Federal Circuit, a computer was “a virtual 
necessity” to the operation of the machine because of the complexity and 
requisite alacrity of the calculations of each mutual fund’s share in the 
partnership. 63  Although it is still uncertain to what extent a hopeful 
applicant’s process claims must require a machine for operation, the 
court’s analysis of the related issue in State Street is worth noting. The 
court discussed its prior opinions in In re Alappat 64  and Arrhythmia 
Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 65  but the discussions 
point in two different directions when viewed from a post-Bilski 
standpoint. The court stated that the patent in Alappat passed statutory-
subject-matter scrutiny because the mathematical algorithm was used to 
produce “a useful, concrete and tangible result.” 66  The court was 
specifically referring to the result of a smooth wave form on a monitor.67
¶16 In Arrhythmia, “the transformation of electrocardiograph signals 
from a patient’s heartbeat by a machine through a series of mathematical 
calculations” was held to be statutory subject matter because it 
corresponded to the patient’s heartbeat.
 
While that analysis sounds very permissive and, if applied consistently, 
would provide most software with a route to patentability, the court’s 
other example—Arrhythmia—is much more restrictive. 
68
¶17 The “useful, concrete and tangible result” test was the most 
significant fallout from State Street,
 Thus, Alappat, as discussed in 
State Street, is much broader than Arrhythmia because the analysis from 
Arrhythmia was based on the signal correlating to a physical entity—the 
patient’s heartbeat. By contrast, Alappat merely required a 
transformation from raw data points to a curve, without the requirement 
that the curve represent a physical entity.  
69
B. After Bilski 
 but presumably, many of the 
software patents granted under that case’s authority were based on the 
broad, permissive analysis of Alappat. In Bilski, however, the Federal 
Circuit adopted an approach much more akin to the more restrictive 
reasoning from Arrhythmia. 
¶18 One glimmer of certainty from Bilski for software patent 
proponents was the fact that, despite recommendations by several amici 
to do so, the Federal Circuit refused to rule that software could never be 
                                                     
63 Id. at 1371. 
64 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
65 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
66 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (citing Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. 
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patented.70
¶19 In Bilski, the Federal Circuit told us that the physicality of the 
steps performed on a computer by software is irrelevant;
 The general tenor of the opinion, however, did not bode well 
for software patent holders and appears to have adopted a more 
restrictive approach to that area.  
71 the inquiry is 
whether the process is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 
whether it transforms any article into a different state or thing. 72 For 
example, the court stated that transformation of electronic data to a visual 
depiction would satisfy statutory-subject-matter requirements, but only if 
the source data is representative of a physical entity.73 The court was also 
clear that if the process could be performed entirely in the human mind, 
it would not be statutory subject matter.74
¶20 However, many questions remain in the area of software patents, 
most notably, the question of whether a general computer is a “particular 
machine” within the meaning of the test.
  
75 Assuming that a computer 
could function as a particular machine for purposes of the test, to what 
extent must a general computer be necessary to perform the process? For 
example, if each individual step in an algorithm could conceivably be 
performed within the human mind over a period of many years, but the 
combination of a piece of software and a computer could perform the 
process in a matter of seconds, would the software be tied to a particular 
machine? In short, what is meant by the phrase, “tied to a particular 
machine?”76
¶21 The majority in Ferguson did not directly address whether a 
computer could be a machine within the meaning of the test. However, 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the Board), whose 
opinion the majority affirmed, rejected the process claims on §101 
grounds, concluding that they “do not expressly or implicitly require 
performance of any of the steps by a machine, such as a general purpose 
digital computer.”
 
77 Thus, the Board appears to view a computer as a 
“particular machine,” 78
                                                     
70 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 n.23 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 at least in certain contexts. Moreover, in her 
concurrence, Judge Newman acknowledges that the Federal Circuit has 
71 See id. at 961. 
72 Id. 
73 See id. at 963. 
74 Id. at 961 n.26. 
75 The Federal Circuit specifically stated that it was leaving that critical question 
for another day. Id. at 962. 
76 Id. at 961. 
77 In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Ex parte 
Ferguson, No. 2003-1044, slip op. at 13 (B.P.A.I. 2004)) (emphasis added). 
78 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. 
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left it as an open question, but suggests that a computer must be a 
“Bilski-acceptable machine[]” in some circumstances.79
¶22 Close analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gottschalk v. 
Benson
 
80 yields additional insight into the possible effects of Bilski on 
the patentability of software. In Benson, the applicants sought a patent 
for a “method of programming a general-purpose digital computer” to 
convert signals from one format to another. 81  Significantly, the 
operations could be performed mentally. 82  The Court concluded, 
therefore, that a computer was unnecessary to the process. 83  That 
conclusion alone might have supported the Court’s ultimate decision to 
reject the claims as not sufficiently tied to a machine.84 However, the 
Court also stated that, because the only practical applications of the 
program would be in the context of a computer, granting a patent on the 
program (though limited to use on a computer) would preempt all uses of 
the mathematical operations themselves. 85
¶23 Importantly, Benson is still good law. But while that opinion 
stopped short of adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the 
exclusive test for statutory subject matter in processes,
 Thus, while the case law 
assumes that a computer could serve as an adequate machine for 
purposes of subject-matter scrutiny of a process claim, the cases also 
create a somewhat confusing paradox: The computer must not be mere 
post-solution activity, that is, it must be necessary to some extent; but 
when the process applies a fundamental principle, the computer must not 
be so necessary to the process as to entirely preempt the underlying 
fundamental principle. 
86  the Bilski 
opinion shut the door on possible exceptions.87
                                                     
79 Ferguson, 558 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., concurring) (stating that, in Bilski, 
“the court recognized that the State Street Bank test was directed to processes 
performed by computer, thus meeting the Bilski test.”). 
 Thus, the Federal Circuit 
seems to have adopted an even stricter approach than that of the Supreme 
80 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
81 Id. at 65. 
82 Id. at 67. 
83 Id.  
84 If the conclusion that a computer was not necessary to the procedure had been 
coupled with an unequivocal statement from the Court that the program failed to 
be tied to a machine because a computer was not strictly necessary to its use, 
that would tend to suggest that it does not matter how impractical performance 
of a mathematical operation might be without the aid of a computer, so long as it 
was strictly possible. This secondary conclusion could threaten the validity of an 
even broader scope of software patents. 
85 See id. at 71–72. 
86 See id. at 71. 
87 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 955–56 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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Court. Based on the language from Bilski, Ferguson, and Benson, it 
appears that many software patents may be in jeopardy either because 
they are not tied to a particular machine 88  or because they have no 
relationship with any physical entity.89
II. BUSINESS METHODS 
 
A. Before Bilski 
¶24 More than any other class, business method patents have been 
heavily criticized. Justice Kennedy has expressed concern over “[t]he 
potential vagueness and suspect validity of some . . . [business method] 
patents.” 90  Broadly patenting business methods has arguably led to 
patents over very mundane practices.91 Additionally, such patents have 
been criticized as doing nothing more than incorporating widely known 
practices into cyberspace. 92  There are also those who view business 
method patents as much more innocuous. For example, in her concurring 
opinion in Ferguson, Judge Newman criticizes the majority’s “retreat 
into the methods of the past.” 93
                                                     
88 This point is capable of multiple readings. A computer could be deemed to 
never suffice as a particular machine. Even if a computer could serve as a 
particular machine, it might be the case that only software whose operations 
absolutely required a computer for their performance would be deemed as 
sufficiently tied to the computer.  
 Following the logic of her opinion, the 
regime from which the majority must be retreating is State Street. And it 
is that opinion that fostered the issuance of so many business method 
patents. Thus, she must at least believe that most of those patents are 
worthy of the protection they have been given. However, State Street 
aside, the last one hundred years of patent jurisprudence has been highly 
unfavorable to methods of doing business. 
A related idea is that, while a computer could serve as a particular machine, if 
the software claimed mathematical algorithms and had no practical application 
outside of a computer, it might be construed to completely preempt the 
mathematical algorithm.  Such an approach would render the software ineligible 
for patent protection.  Logically, this concept must be limited to the context of 
process claims that involve application of fundamental principles (e.g., 
mathematical algorithms). It is still relevant to the current discussion, because 
this concept presupposes that computers may suffice as a machine in other 
scenarios.  
89 See id. 
90 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
91 See Dreyfuss, supra note 56, at 268. 
92 Id. at 279. 
93 See In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., 
concurring). 
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¶25 Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.94 is the case that is 
credited with the “business method exception” to statutory subject 
matter. 95  In that case, the patent claimed a system related to cash 
registers intended to prevent fraud and theft by employees of restaurants 
and hotels. 96 The basic idea was that each employee was assigned a 
number and that number was used to identify all transactions performed 
by the employee on behalf of the business.97 The court held that “[a] 
system of transacting business disconnected from the means of carrying 
out the system is not . . . an art.”98 Thus, the business method exception 
was born; and Lorraine and its line were responsible for severely 
limiting the success of business method patents for ninety years.99
¶26 In 1998, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in State Street marked the 
end of the quasi-prohibition against business method patents,
 
100 and in 
similar fashion, its effect on software patents, leading almost 
immediately to a significant increase in business method patent 
activity.101 In State Street, the Federal Circuit rejected the notion that 
business methods, as a class, were not eligible subject matter for patent 
protection.102 The court held that patent applications drawn to business 
methods were eligible so long as they met all the requirements of one of 
the categories of subject matter.103
¶27 The machine claimed in State Street for managing mutual funds 
was limited by the incorporation of a computer.
 
104
                                                     
94 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
 The court applied its 
“useful, concrete and tangible result” test and held that “the 
transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a 
95 See William D. Wiese, Death of a Myth: The Patenting of Internet Business 
Models After State Street Bank, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 30 (2000). 
To clarify, Wiese merely cites Lorraine as the case others look to as the 
progenitor of the business method exception and actually concludes that the 
exception never, in fact, existed. 
96 Lorraine, 160 F. at 467. 
97 See id. at 467–69. 
98 Id. at 469. At the time, Congress had not yet replaced the term “art” with 
“process.” See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
99 See Wiese, supra note 95, at 30. 
100 Id. 
101 See Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method 
Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional 
History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 66 (2002). 
102 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 139 F.3d 
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Some have concluded that the “business method 
exception” never existed. See Wiese, supra note 95, at 18. 
103 State Street, 139 F.3d at 1375. 
104 Id. at 1371. 
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machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share 
price” is statutory subject matter within the meaning of the statute.105 The 
court went on to explain that the process employed a mathematical 
algorithm toward a practical application by producing the requisite 
“useful, concrete and tangible result.”106 Specifically, the “result” was 
the accurate share price for each mutual fund based on the percentage 
stake in the partnership by the particular fund.107
B. After Bilski 
  
¶28 In Bilski, the Federal Circuit affirmed its prior rejection of a 
categorical exclusion of business methods from patentable subject 
matter.108 However, unlike the broadly inclusive language of State Street, 
the new opinion and its new test are very restrictive. While the court 
rejected the “Freeman-Walter-Abele” test, which required that a 
mathematical algorithm be connected to physical elements or process 
steps, 109  the “machine-or-transformation” test, nonetheless, seems to 
require an algorithm to be grounded in some physical element, at least in 
most cases. In discussing those cases of its predecessor court, the Federal 
Circuit alluded to the fact that it had held unpatentable a process for 
rendering a graphical representation of data,110 yet held patent-eligible 
another patent because it was drawn to a process to electronically display 
images of a patient’s bones and internal organs.111 The critical difference 
for the court was the process’s connection to physical elements.112
¶29 In Ferguson, the Federal Circuit made significant progress in 
explaining Bilski, especially in the context of business methods. Besides 
explaining, generally, the correct interpretations of both prongs of the 
new test,
  
113 the court also gave some insight as to the viability of State 
Street. The court said that Bilski did not overturn State Street, but that it 
did supersede the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test with the 
“machine-or-transformation” test for all §101 determinations. 114
                                                     
105 Id. at 1373. 
 In 
106 Id. 
107 Id. In its discussion of “so-called business methods” within Bilski, the 
Federal Circuit questioned whether processes dealing in “abstract constructs 
such as legal obligations, organizational relationships, and business risks” might 
qualify as statutory subject matter through the transformation prong of the 
transformation-or-machine test. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
108 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960. 
109 Id. at 959. 
110 Id. at 962. 
111 Id. at 962–63. 
112 See id. at 963. 
113 See In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1363–65 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
114 See id. at 1364 n.3. 
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response to the applicant’s argument that his process claims should be 
approved under State Street as business methods, the court was only 
willing to distinguish State Street on its facts by stating that the claims in 
that case were drawn to a machine.115 It seems that the court intended to 
mummify State Street in order to allow it to replace the test without 
having to conclude that business methods are per se non-statutory subject 
matter.116
¶30 Thus, business methods will be facing many of the same 
challenges that software patents now face. After all, many business 
methods are inextricably intertwined with computers and software. 
Similar to the area of software patents, where the most pressing question 
after Bilski is whether, and in what context, a personal computer can 
serve as a machine, one of the questions in the realm of business method 
patents is what devices could serve as a machine. As a practical matter, if 
a personal computer cannot be the machine, then what other devices can 
business methods be linked to? Moreover, when will a business method 
transform an article to a different state or thing? The examples from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Benson—“tanning, dyeing, making 
waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
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III. DIAGNOSTIC ASSAYS 
—are not 
likely intended to encourage business method patent applications. 
A. Before Bilski 
¶31 In Bislki, the Federal Circuit discussed several precedents that 
dealt with diagnostic tests.118 Specifically, it discussed In re Meyer,119 In 
re Grams,120 and Justice Breyer’s dissent from dismissal of certiorari in 
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, 
Inc.121
¶32 The Meyer case involved a diagnostic process to determine the 
source of a malfunction in a complex system.
  
122
                                                     
115 See id. at 1365. 
 Although the process 
was not expressly limited to the field of neurology, neurology was one 
field in which the applicant claimed the process would have a useful 
116 Further evidence of this conclusion is given in the language: “in Bilski this 
court refused to extend or even to take a broad reading of the holding in State 
Street.” Id. 
117 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. 
118 See id. at 965. 
119 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
120 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
121 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
122 See Meyer, 688 F.2d at 793. 
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application.123 The court held the process ineligible for patent protection 
because it was preemptive of a fundamental principle—specifically, a 
mathematical algorithm.124 Even as drafted, the claims probably would 
have passed scrutiny after State Street opened the floodgates for 
previously questionable patents, but especially if the claims had been 
limited to use on a computer.125
¶33 In Grams, the applicant’s claims described a process to diagnose 
a patient by analyzing the levels of various constituents in his body fluids 
which were measured via laboratory testing.
 
126 As in Meyer, the court 
held that the claims were not drawn to statutory subject matter because 
they would preempt a mathematical algorithm.127
¶34 Justice Breyer, with two other justices, discussed the issue of 
diagnostic assay patentability in a dissenting opinion from a dismissal of 
certiorari in Laboratory Corp.
 If those same claims 
had been made with the addition of a claim to incorporate a computer to 
produce the result of the process, the claims would certainly have passed 
under State Street’s permissive rule. But, even as stated, the patent would 
probably have passed muster under State Street. 
128 The facts of that case involved a patent 
application for a process to diagnose vitamin deficiencies by measuring 
the concentration of a particular amino acid in the patient’s blood.129 The 
lower courts had held that the patent was valid and enforced a judgment 
for infringement.130 The Court granted certiorari, but then dismissed the 
case, concluding that certiorari had been improvidently granted.131
¶35 While the message to be gleaned from the Court dismissing the 
case is unclear, it seems that a reasonable conclusion would be that a 
majority of the Court would have upheld the patent. The three dissenters, 
however, expressed strong disapproval both of the dismissal of certiorari 
and of the validity of the diagnostic assay patent.  
 
¶36 Citing Diehr, Flook, and many other cases, the dissent argued 
that the claims were not drawn to statutory subject matter because they 
were merely attempting to patent a biological relationship between the 
                                                     
123 Id. at 790–91. 
124 Id. at 796. 
125 In particular, State Street’s removal of any requirement for a limitation to a 
physical element would have made the claims in Meyer much stronger. 
126 See Grams, 888 F.2d at 836–37. 
127 See id. at 841. 
128 See Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 
548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 125–26. 
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concentration of the amino acid and the concentration of the two 
vitamins.132 The application included claims drawn to novel methods for 
measuring the amino acid concentration—gas chromatography and mass 
spectrometry—but the lower courts construed the claims as not limited to 
those methods.133 The dissent briefly discusses State Street, seemingly 
admitting that State Street’s “useful, concrete and tangible result” test 
would have supported the patent. 134  But the dissent also expressly 
disavowed ever adopting the test from State Street135 and concluded that 
the claimed subject matter at issue in Laboratory Corp. was an 
“unpatentable ‘natural phenomenon.’”136
¶37 There is significant doubt as to the take-away implications of the 
dismissal of the writ of certiorari, especially because the lower courts had 
not directly considered the statutory-subject-matter issue.
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B. After Bilski 
 However, 
Breyer’s dissent gives us some important insight into the view of three 
justices. Furthermore, if we assume that the majority of the Court would 
have upheld the patent, it would tend to establish the Court’s 
endorsement of the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street. However, if 
we believe that the dismissal of certiorari was based on the technicality 
of not having the lower court directly address the § 101 issue, then the 
dismissal’s meaning is much less certain. That uncertainty 
notwithstanding, it is fairly clear that at least the dissent believed that the 
claims would satisfy the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test but 
would not meet its own test of statutory subject matter. 
¶38 Bilski is dispositive with respect to the § 101 analysis of all 
process patents, but it has unevenly restricted the patentability of 
diagnostic assays along with other “knowledge products.” Under this 
more restrictive regime, when a diagnostic test is not tied to a particular 
measurement and is not limited to any particular machine or system, it 
may well be rejected as an attempt to preempt a fundamental principle.138
¶39 Upon inspection under the machine-or-transformation approach, 
it seems fairly obvious that neither the patent in Meyer nor the patent in 
Grams would survive scrutiny. Neither of the respective processes was 
transforming anything physically or chemically, nor was there any 
  
                                                     
132 Id. at 135. 
133 Id. at 125, 28. 
134 See id. at 136–37. 
135 Id. at 136. 
136 Id. at 138. 
137 See id. at 132. 
138 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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physical limitation claimed in the applications.139 Moreover, they were 
not limited to use in conjunction with a particular machine, not even a 
computer.140
¶40 It is also highly doubtful whether the claims in Laboratory Corp. 
would now pass the Federal Circuit’s statutory-subject-matter scrutiny. 
The claim in dispute was not limited to any of the specialized laboratory 
methods or equipment
 
141 and thus would probably not be sufficiently tied 
to a machine. Further, it is difficult to imagine what transformation the 
process could be accomplishing by measuring the level of an amino acid 
in a blood sample.142
¶41 As mere illustrations of the probable effects of Bilski on § 101 
analysis of diagnostic tests, those examples indicate that the patentability 
of this particular realm of subject matter has been substantially restricted. 
By adopting the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test for 
determining whether a process is patentable subject matter, the Federal 
Circuit has likely taken an even more restrictive approach to statutory 
subject matter than the Supreme Court. 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶42 By adopting the machine-or-transformation test for all process-
patent claims, the Federal Circuit has significantly reduced the scope of § 
101’s coverage, but it has made it especially difficult for those applicants 
seeking patents over knowledge products. That court has clearly stated 
its purpose, which is to prevent the preemption of fundamental 
principles,143
¶43 In Bilski, the Federal Circuit alluded to the possibility that the 
Supreme Court may decide to alter the new test because of difficulties 
stemming from advances in technology.
 but it remains to be seen whether the test it has adopted will 
be too narrow. One’s idea of a “good” test for determining statutory 
subject matter depends greatly upon whether one thinks patenting 
software, business methods, and diagnostic tests is generally a good idea. 
And regardless of whether the results of a particular test are interpreted 
as positive or negative for society as a whole, there will certainly be an 
impact from such a significant change.  
144 Having granted certiorari in 
Bilski,145
                                                     
139 See In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 790–93 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Grams, 888 
F.2d 835, 836–37 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 the Supreme Court has accepted the Federal Circuit’s invitation 
140 See Meyer, 688 F.2d at 790–93; Grams, 888 F.2d at 836–37. 
141 See Laboratory Corp., 548 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
142 See id. 
143 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. 
144 Id. at 956. 
145 Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
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to speak on the issue. As we await the Court’s decision, it is important to 
consider that the Court has never expressly adopted the test formulated in 
Bilski and has, at least on one occasion, expressly stated that an 
application’s failure to meet the test would not inevitably render the 
claims unpatentable.146
 
 However the Court decides the case, hopefully 
the opinion will bring needed certainty to this important area of law. 
                                                     
146 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972). 
